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Congress Considering Legislation Aimed at Increasing Competition in
Pharmaceuticals
Christopher M. Holman ∗
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Congress is currently considering a large number of bills
that would attempt to bring down drug prices by a variety or means,
including some aimed at reform of certain patent-related aspects of
the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA). This Article begins with a brief
overview some key provisions of Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA
that have been targeted by these legislative initiatives. It then turns
to a discussion of some specific bills currently being considered by
Congress that would seek to promote greater competition in the
market for pharmaceuticals by amendments to the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act (FDCA) and Public Health Service Act (PHS Act),
i.e., the two statutes that were amended by Hatch-Waxman and the
BPCIA, as well as aspects of the Patent Act relating to HatchWaxman. Also included in the discussion are bills that would seek
to prevent pharmaceutical companies from settling patent litigation
brought under Hatch-Waxman and/or the BPCIA through so-called
“reverse payment settlements.”

In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. Hatch-Waxman was designed to promote
pharmaceutical competition by facilitating generic market entry, while at the same time
maintaining adequate incentives for future innovation. 1 Although most would agree that HatchWaxman has by and large succeeded in its mission, some would argue that certain provisions of
the Act, particularly those relating to patents, have been gamed by pharmaceutical companies in
a manner that has frustrated the desire for generic competition. At a time the cost of drugs has
taken center stage, it is not surprising that Congress is currently considering a large number of
bills that would attempt to bring down drug prices, some aimed at reform of certain patentrelated aspects of Hatch-Waxman and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
∗
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2009 (BPCIA)(which can be thought of as Hatch-Waxman’s analog for biological
pharmaceutical products, most of which do not fall under the Hatch-Waxman regime). 2
This article begins with a brief overview some key provisions of Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA
that have been the target of current legislative reform efforts. It then turns to a discussion of
some specific bills currently being considered by Congress that would seek to promote greater
competition in the market for pharmaceuticals by amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act (FDCA) and Public Health Service Act (PHS Act), i.e., the two statutes that were amended
by Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA, as well as aspects of the Patent Act relating to HatchWaxman. Also included in the discussion are bills that would seek to prevent pharmaceutical
companies from settling patent litigation brought under Hatch-Waxman and/or the BPCIA
through so-called “reverse payment settlements.”

Overview of Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA
In order to market an innovative new drug in the U.S., the drug’s sponsor must obtain FDA
approval of a new drug application (“NDA”) containing data demonstrating, among other things,
the safety and efficacy of the drug. 3 Hatch-Waxman created an abbreviated pathway for the
approval of generic drugs by means of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), which
greatly reduces the cost of bringing a generic a drug to market by permitting a generic company
to essentially free ride on much of the costs incurred by the branded drug company in obtaining
approval of the original NDA. 4 The ANDA process is one of two abbreviated pathways
provided by Hatch-Waxman, the other being the increasingly relevant 505(b)(2) pathway,
sometimes referred to as the “paper NDA.” 5
Under Hatch-Waxman, the holder of an approved NDA is required to list certain patents relating
to the approved drug in the FDA’s Orange Book (formally titled the Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations), i.e., all patents covering the drug’s active ingredient,
patents on specific formulations or compositions of the drug, and patents covering the methods
of using the drug. 6
Every ANDA must include a certification for each patent listed in the Orange Book with respect
to the branded drug targeted for generic competition. 7 The certification for each listed patent
must be one of four types, commonly referred to as the Paragraph I-IV certifications. In an
ANDA containing only Paragraph I, II, and/or III certifications, the applicant effectively
acknowledges the existence of any listed patents, and agrees not to enter the market until all of
the patents have expired. Alternatively, a generic drug company can challenge a listed patent by
2

Public Law 111-148.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
4
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
5
FDA Guidance Document, Applications Covered by Section 505(b)(2), available at
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/applications-covered-section-505b2
(last visited May 11, 2019).
6
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
7
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
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making a Paragraph IV certification, whereby the ANDA applicant asserts that the patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug for which the ANDA applicant seeks
approval. An ANDA filer that makes a Paragraph IV certification must provide a notice to the
branded drug company with a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for the ANDA
filer’s assertion that the patent is invalid or not infringed. 8
Upon receiving notice of a Paragraph IV certification, the patent owner has two options. One
option is to bring an immediate, pre-marketing infringement suit against the ANDA applicant.
Under Hatch-Waxman, the mere filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is an act of
constructive infringement, permitting the patent owner to bring suit as soon as the certification is
filed. 9 If the lawsuit is filed within forty-five days of the patent holder receiving notice of the
Paragraph IV certification, that filing will invoke an automatic stay of FDA approval of the
ANDA, commonly referred to as the “30-month stay.” The 30-month stay lasts until the earliest
of one of the following occurrences: (1) the expiration of 30 months from the receipt of notice of
the Paragraph IV certification; (2) a final determination of patent invalidity or noninfringement
by a district court; or (3) expiration of the patent.
Alternatively, if the patent owner fails to sue within 45 days, the benefit of the 30-month stay
provision is forfeited, and the generic challenger is free to market the drug upon FDA approval
of the ANDA. Upon generic market entry, the patent owner remains free to sue the generic
company in a standard patent infringement action.
Analogous Paragraph IV certification provisions also apply to the 505(b)(2) “paper NDA”
pathway. For simplicity, most of the discussion this article will focus on the more well-known
ANDA pathway.
In order to incentivize patent challenges, Hatch-Waxman provides that the first generic applicant
to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification is eligible for 180 days of marketing
exclusivity, during which the FDA may not approve any subsequent ANDA corresponding to the
same branded product. The requirements for receiving the 180 days of generic exclusivity
(“180-day exclusivity”) were originally quite straightforward; commencement of 180-day
exclusivity was triggered by either the first commercial marketing of the generic drug by the
first-filer, or by a court decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed. 10 However, if the
first filer reaches an agreement settling Paragraph IV litigation pursuant to which the first-filer
agrees to delay or forgo market entry, it can create a bottleneck potentially precluding any other
generic company from entering the market with a generic version of the drug until expiration of
the challenged patent or patents. The potential for a single agreement between a generic
company and the branded drug company to park 180-day exclusivity in a manner that precludes
any other generic company from entering the market prior to patent expiration has long been a

8

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
10
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
9
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source of concern, particularly at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 11 and is the subject of
some of the legislative proposals discussed below.
The BPCIA provides an abbreviated approval process for biological drugs that is analogous to,
but in many respects substantially different from, the ANDA and 505(b)(2) abbreviated approval
processes created by Hatch-Waxman and available for drugs regulated under the FDCA, which
for the most part are traditional, small molecule drugs. For one thing, there is no statutory
requirement, under the BPCIA or otherwise, for an equivalent to the Orange Book for biological
products regulated under the PHS Act. Instead of requiring patent owners to file a list of related
patents for any approved biological pharmaceutical product, the BPCIA provides for a complex
exchange of patent information, sometimes referred to as the “patent dance,” which only
becomes relevant if an application is filed for approval of a biosimilar or interchangeable version
of the biological product under the abbreviated pathway provided under the BPCIA. 12 The
patent dance begins when an applicant seeking approval of a biosimilar or interchangeable
product under the abbreviated pathway provides the reference product sponsor, i.e., the
innovator, with a copy of the application, plus a description of the proposed manufacturing
process. The reference product sponsor is then required to respond with a list of patents owned
or exclusively licensed that could “reasonably be asserted” against a party manufacturing or
marketing a biosimilar version of the innovative product. This list of patents is the closest the
BPCIA comes to the Orange Book’s patent list mandated under Hatch-Waxman.
On its own initiative, FDA began to publish a “Purple Book,” which can be thought of as an
analog of the Orange Book applicable to biological products. The official title of the Purple
Book is “Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclusivity and
Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations.” Because the Purple Book is not mandated by
statute, FDA has the discretion to provide any information it sees fit in the Purple Book, or to
discontinue the Purple Book altogether. 13 FDA designed the Purple Book to help enable a user
determine whether a particular biological product has been determined by FDA to be biosimilar
to or interchangeable with a reference biological product. 14 The lists cross-references the names
of biological products licensed under section 351(a) of the PHS Act (the original, innovative
biological product) with the names of biosimilar or interchangeable biological products licensed
under section 351(k)(the statutory basis of the abbreviated approval process for biosimilar and
interchangeable biological products). If FDA has determined that a biological product is
protected by a period of reference product exclusivity under section 351(k)(7), the list will

11

Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489 (2007).
12
CRS Report, Drug Pricing and Intellectual Property Law: A Legal Overview for the 116th Congress at 32-33
(April 9, 2019). See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l).
13
FDA, Background Information: Lists of Licensed Biological Products with Reference Product Exclusivity and
Biosimilarity or Interchangeability Evaluations (Purple Book), available at
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/background-information-lists-licensed-biological-products-referenceproduct-exclusivity-and (last visited May 11, 2019).
14
Id.
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identify the date of first licensure and the date that reference product exclusivity (including any
attached pediatric exclusivity) will expire. 15
With this background in mind, let us turn to a consideration of some of the proposed legislation
that would alter the dynamics of drug approval and patent exclusivity under the regimes created
by Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA.

Legislation Directed Towards Orange Book Listing Requirements
The Orange Book Transparency Act, H.R. 1503, would amend the FDCA in a number of ways.
For one, it would prohibit FDA from listing any patent in the Orange Book to the extent that
such patent claims a device that is used for the delivery of the drug. This provision is no doubt
prompted by the recent uproar over large increases in the price of the EpiPen product. The
EpiPen dispenses epinephrine, a non-patented drug, and the patents associated with the EpiPen
product are directed towards the device used to deliver the drug. By prohibiting Orange Book
listing of patents on drug delivery devices, proponents of the bill presumably seek to prevent a
branded drug company from securing a 30-month stay under Hatch-Waxman based on a drug
delivery device patent.
H.R. 1503 would also require listing in the Orange Book of all non-patent exclusivity periods
applicable to the approved drug, such as pediatric exclusivity under 505(A), orphan exclusivity,
etc. The bill would also require the removal from the list of patents that have been found invalid
in proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) or a final, nonappealable court
decision. The bill specifies that the FDA shall not remove from the list any invalidated patent
prior to the expiration of any 180-day exclusivity period based on a successful Paragraph IV
challenge that patent. It also requires the FDA to review the types of patent information that
should be included in the Orange Book, and report to Congress on the results of such review,
including any recommendations about the types of patent information that should be included or
removed from the Orange Book patent listing.
On May 8, 2019, the House passed H.R. 1503 and the bill has moved to the Senate for
consideration.
The Reforming Evergreening and Manipulation that Extends Drug Years Act (the “REMEDY
Act,”), S. 1209, would amend Hatch-Waxman such that the filing of a lawsuit would only result
in a 30-month stay if the Orange Book listed patent claims a drug substance, i.e., a drug active
ingredient. If the patent only claims a drug product, such as a drug formulation, or a method of
using the drug, there will be no automatic 30-month stay to stand in the way of approval and
marketing of the generic product. This distinction between drug substance patents, often referred
to as “primary” pharmaceutical patents, and drug product and method of use patents, often
referred to as “secondary” pharmaceutical patents, reflects the often espoused view that while

15

FDA, Reference Product Exclusivity for Biological Products Filed Under Section 351(a) of the PHS Act (PDF 99KB), available at https://www.fda.gov/media/89049/download (last visited May 11, 2019).
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primary patents are generally legitimate, secondary patents are used by drug companies to obtain
unjustified extension of patent exclusivity, sometimes referred to as “evergreening.” 16
S. 1209 would require removal from the Orange Book of any listed patent that has had “any
claim” relating to the drug or use of the drug canceled pursuant to a determination by the PTAB
in an inter partes review (IPR) or post-grant review (PGR), so long as the cancellation (if
appealed) has been upheld on appeal. This amendment is presumably intended to address
situations in which patents with canceled claims have remained listed in the Orange Book and
arguably created an impediment to generic market entry. I would think that the bill’s language
calling for the striking from the Orange Book of any patent with respect to which “any claim”
relating to the drug or use of the drug has been canceled should be interpreted as requiring the
cancellation of “any and all claims” relating to the drug or use of the drug. If all that was
required to strike a patent from the Orange Book was the cancellation of “any claim” relating to
the drug or its use, then this proposed change to Hatch-Waxman would seem to require removal
from the Orange Book of a patent containing claims that have survived review by the PTAB, and
are thus still presumptively valid, and which would be infringed by a generic product.
S. 1209 would also amend Hatch-Waxman in a manner intended to ensure that the striking of a
patent from the Orange Book based on cancellation of claims by the PTAB will have no effect
on a first ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity, provided that at the time the first applicant
submitted an application containing a Paragraph IV certification, the patent that was the subject
of such certification was listed in the Orange Book in connection with the subject drug.

Legislation Creating a Statutory Basis for the Purple Book
The Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019, H.R. 1520, would amend that the PHS Act to require
the FDA to publish a Purple Book and make it electronically available to the public. Under the
bill, the Purple Book would include a list of the official and proprietary name of each innovative
biological product for which a biologics license under section 351(a) is in effect, the date it was
licensed, and whether in vitro or in vitro bioequivalence studies, or both, are required for
applications filed under section 351(k) for a biosimilar or interchangeable product that will refer
to the innovative biological product. The FDA would be required to revise the list every 30 days
to include any newly licensed biological products under 351(a) or (k).
H.R. 1520 includes a requirement that “[w]hen patent information has been provided by the
reference product sponsor to the subsection (k) applicant respecting a biological product included
on the list … the Secretary shall … include such information [on the list].” Thus, the Purple
Book would not contain a listing of patents associated with the drug and its use unless the
biological product serves as a reference product for a biosimilar or interchangeable product
under the abbreviated 351(k) pathway. But if a 351(k) application is filed, and the parties engage
16

Christopher M. Holman, In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for
Pharmaceutical Patent Examination, 50 Indiana Law Review 759 (2017) (arguing that secondary pharmaceutical
patent claims are necessary for incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation and neither inherently less legitimate and
nor less worthy of protection than primary patents).
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in 351(k)’s “patent dance,” then the list of patents provided by the reference product sponsor
pursuant to the dance will be published in the Purple Book.
H.R. 1520 would also require the Sec. of Health and Human Services to complete a review of,
and formulate recommendations on, the types of biological product patents that should be
included in, or removed from, the list required under the Act, and report such recommendations
to Congress.
On May 8, 2019, the House passed H.R. 1520 passed and the bill has moved to the Senate for
consideration.
In the Senate, the Biologic Patent Transparency Act, S. 659, would also amend the PHS Act to
create a statutory requirement that FDA publish and maintain a single, searchable, publicly
accessible list of approved biological products. The bill specifies that with respect to each listed
biological product the list provide the date of licensure and licensure status, marketing status,
dosage form, route of administration, strength, and, if applicable, reference product, plus any
period of reference product exclusivity, orphan exclusivity, and/or pediatric exclusivity,
information regarding any determination related to biosimilarity or interchangeability, and
information regarding approved indications for each such biological product.
Like H.R. 1520, S. 659 requires a list of patents, but the listing requirement is quite different in
the Senate bill, which requires the disclosure of any patent for which the holder of a biological
product license “believes a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted by the
holder, or by a patent owner that has granted an exclusive license to the holder with respect to
the biological product that is the subject of such license, if a person not licensed by the holder
engaged in the making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the United States of the
biological product that is the subject of such license.” Giving teeth to this requirement, the bill
would also amend section 271(e) of the Patent Statute such that the owner of a patent that
“should have been included in the list” mandated by S. 659 “but was not timely included in such
list, it may not bring an action under this section for infringement of the patent.” In other words,
a failure to properly list a patent could result in a patent owner forfeiting its ability to enforce the
patent under the Patent Act. 17

Legislation Targeting Reverse Payment Settlements
Some of the proposed legislation would seek to limit the ability of brand and generic companies
to enter into so-called “reverse payment settlements” resolving patent litigation brought under
Hatch-Waxman. The term “reverse payment” has been used as shorthand to characterize a
variety of diverse agreements between patent owners and alleged infringers that involve a
transfer of consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer. 18 The “payment” is
17

The patent owner would apparently not be barred from enforcing its patent under some other statute, such as
through as International Trade Commission complaint brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
18
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489 (2007).
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“reverse” in the sense that one would normally expect any payment associated with settlement of
a patent infringement lawsuit to flow from the accused infringer to the patent owner, not the
other way around. In its most straightforward form, a reverse payment settlement involves a
cash payment from the patent owner to the accused infringer, in exchange for which the which
the accused infringer agrees to delay market entry, which has led some to label these agreements
as “pay for delay,” a pejorative term with clear antitrust implications. In many cases, however,
the alleged payment comes not in the form of cash but in some other non-cash consideration, or
as part of an ancillary agreement, and consideration often flows both ways.
Although in principle any parties to a patent infringement lawsuit could agree to a settlement
involving a reverse payment, it is widely believed that reverse payment settlements are rare
outside the context of brand-generic disputes. However, it must be noted that in general the
terms of agreements settling patent litigation are confidential, so it is impossible to know how
prevalent they might be outside the realm of pharmaceutical litigation. The law specifically
requires pharmaceutical companies to disclose the terms of agreements to settle brand-generic
disputes to the FTC, and based on these disclosures we know that such agreements do exist, and
depending upon how one defines “reverse payment settlement,” i.e., to what extent non-cash
consideration and ancillary agreements are assumed to be payments for delayed market entry,
these agreements have at times been fairly common. As a practical matter, reverse payment
settlements have only been seen as an issue in the context of brand-generic patent disputes, and
for the remainder of this article the term “reverse payment settlement” will be used to denote an
agreement settling a lawsuit between a branded drug company and would-be generic competitor
under Hatch-Waxman.
The FTC has taken an active interest in reverse payment settlements since the 1990s, and has
challenged a number of these agreements as anticompetitive and in violation of antitrust laws. 19
Early on, most courts rejected the assertion that the presence of a reverse payment constitutes a
per se violation of antitrust laws, or even a presumption of antitrust violation. The judges that
decided these cases often found that while the presence of a reverse payment might appear
suspicious, in fact a reverse payment is a natural outcome of the unique dynamics created by
Paragraph IV litigation. In lawsuits brought by branded drug companies under Hatch-Waxman,
the allocation of risk is very different than in most other patent litigations, where the accused
infringer typically risks substantial money damages if it loses, and thus it makes sense for the
accused infringer to pay the patent owner settle the case. In the context of Hatch-Waxman
litigation, on the other hand, the defendant generic company is not at risk of having to pay
damages; at most, the generic company is looking at an injunction that will delay market entry.
The branded company, on the other hand, risks loss of market exclusivity and a resulting huge
loss of revenue with the entry of generic competition. This substantial reallocation of risk
between patent owner and accused infringer renders reverse payments entirely rational in brandgeneric disputes, and courts generally found that the flow of consideration from the patent owner

19

Id.
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to accused infringer did not, in and of itself, raise an inference that the settlement is
anticompetitive.
Eventually, however, the FTC achieved a favorable ruling that resulted in a circuit split
prompting the Supreme Court to weigh in on reverse payment settlements in 2013. In FTC v.
Actavis, a divided Supreme Court overruled a decision by the 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals
which had held that as long as the anticompetitive effects of a patent settlement fall within the
scope of the patent’s exclusionary potential, the settlement is immune from antitrust attack. The
majority was unwilling, however, to go so far as to adopt the FTC’s position that reverse
payment settlements are presumptively unlawful. Instead, the Court charted a middle course,
instructing courts to apply the “rule of reason” when reviewing such agreements for compliance
with the antitrust laws. Under the “rule of reason,” a court is to look at the agreement and the
context in which it occurs, and to balance the anticompetitive harm of the agreement against any
procompetitive benefits. The agreement should be found to violate the antitrust law only if it can
be shown that the anticompetitive harm outweighs the procompetitive benefits.
Actavis left many unanswered questions with which the lower courts have just begun to grapple.
For example, what is required in order for consideration passing from the patent owner to a
generic company to be considered a “payment”? Some courts have found that the payment must
be in the form of cash in order to come under Actavis, but others have held that the payment can
be in the form of non-cash consideration, such as a no-authorized generic (no-AG) agreement, a
co-promotion agreement, or a licensing and distribution agreement between the parties, and this
broader interpretation of payment appears to be an emerging consensus. Another ongoing
question is under what circumstances the size of a reverse payment can serve as a surrogate for
the weakness of the patent owner’s case.
The Competitive DRUGS Act of 2019, H.R. 1344, would effectively overturn Actavis by creating
a strong legal presumption that a reverse payment settlement violates the antitrust laws unless it
can be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that either the payment is not given in
return for delayed market entry by a generic competitor, but is instead compensation solely for
other goods or services, or that procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh
anticompetitive effect. In effect, the legislation would overturn the Supreme Court and codify
the position advanced by the FTC in Actavis.
H.R. 1344 provides that any agreement resolving or settling, on a final or interim basis, a patent
infringement claim, in connection with the sale of a drug product, shall be an unfair method of
competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, if pursuant to the
agreement (1) an ANDA filer receives anything of value, including an exclusive or nonexclusive license, an agreement regarding the marketing the product, or any other commercial
opportunity or benefit; and (2) the ANDA filer agrees to limit or forgo research, development,
manufacturing, marketing, or sales of the ANDA product for any period of time. The bill would
not prohibit a settlement in which the consideration granted to the ANDA filer as part of the
settlement includes one or more of the following and nothing else: (1) the right to market the
9
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ANDA product in the U.S. prior to the expiration of any patent that is the basis for the patent
infringement claim, or any patent right or other statutory exclusivity that would prevent the
marketing of such drug; (2) a payment, not to exceed $7,500,000, if based on reasonable
litigation expenses; or (3) a covenant not to sue on any claim that the ANDA product infringes a
U.S. patent.
H.R. 1344 provides for enforcement by the FTC, with judicial review in the U.S. Courts of
Appeal. It also provides for a civil penalty sufficient to deter such violations, up to three times
the value received by the party that is reasonably attributable to such violation, which will accrue
to the government of the United State. The bill also provides a variety of other penalties,
including amending the Internal Revenue Code to impose a tax of 50% on receipt of pay-fordelay payments and denial of tax deduction for pay-for-delay payments, as well as clawback of
research and development tax benefits from manufacturers found to have entered into an illegal
reverse payment settlement. Consent decrees entered into with FTC would be deemed
violations for purposes of triggering the clawback provision.
Another bill that has also been introduced in the House, the Protecting Consumer Access to
Generic Drugs Act of 2019, H.R. 1499, largely tracks H.R. 1344, albeit with some notable
differences. H.R. 1344 only applies to reverse payment settlements entered into by an ANDA
filer, and thus is limited to drugs regulated under the FDCA, which are generally traditional
small-molecule drugs. To date, this has been where most of the branded-generic litigation has
occurred, and has been the focus of reverse payment settlement enforcement. H.R. 1344 would
not addresses settlements of litigation brought under the BPCIA, wherein the branded product is
a biological product and the patent challenger seeks to bring a biosimilar or interchangeable
product to market. This limitation is addressed in H.R. 1499, which explicitly encompasses
reverse payment settlements involving both ANDA filers and firms applying for approval of a
biosimilar or interchangeable biological product.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the two bills is that H.R. 1499 does not include
H.R.1344’s exception for any agreement which the parties can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence provides procompetitive benefits outweighing its anticompetitive effects.
H.R. 1499 would also amend the FDCA such that a generic company found to have violated the
law by entering into a reverse payment settlement will be required to forfeit any 180-day
exclusivity period it would have otherwise enjoyed, particularly as a first Paragraph IV filer. On
April 3, 2019, H.R. 1499 was reported out of committee and sent to the full House.
The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, H.R. 2375, is the most recent
reverse payment bill to be introduced in the House, and represents something of a hybrid
between H.R. 1344 and H.R. 1499. H.R. 2375 largely tracks the language of H.R. 1499,
applying to both generics and biosimilars, but reintroduces the exception for any agreement
which the parties can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence provides procompetitive
benefits outweighing its anticompetitive effects. On April 30, 2019, H.R. 2375 was reported out
of committee and sent to the full House.
10
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Legislation to Curb “Gaming” of 180-Day Exclusivity
As discussed above, some reverse payment settlements have resulted in the “parking” of a first
filers 180-day exclusivity in a manner that blocks other generic competitors from entering the
market, which has understandably created competition concerns. In fact, it was this parking of
the 180-day exclusivity that initially caused the FTC to have concerns with reverse payment
settlements. 20
In 2003, Congress sought to address the 180-day exclusivity parking problem through provisions
in the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) amending Hatch-Waxman. These amendments
provide that a first filer will forfeit its 180-day exclusivity if a “forfeiture event,” as defined by
the amendments, occurs with respect to that first filer. “Forfeiture events” include failure to
market the generic drug in a timely manner, e.g., within 75 days of approval of the ANDA
application or 30 months after submission of the ANDA application, withdrawal of the
application, amendment or withdrawal of the Paragraph IV certification, failure to obtain
tentative approval, or entry into of an agreement with another drug company that is found to be
in violation of the antitrust laws by the FTC or court, e.g., a reverse payment settlement. 21
Although the forfeiture provisions introduced by the 2003 amendments were intended to prevent
parking of 180-day exclusivity, they were not entirely successful, and the potential for the
creation of a bottleneck continues to some extent. 22 The challenge comes in trying to amend the
180-day exclusivity provisions of Hatch-Waxman to eliminate the potential for parking 180-day
exclusivity without, at the same time, creating situations where a first filer loses its 180-day
exclusivity in the absence of any reverse payment or other improper collusion with a patent
owner. Members of Congress continue to propose legislation to amend the 180-day exclusivity
provisions of Hatch-Waxman in a manner intended to prevent gaming of 180-day exclusivity to
the detriment of generic competition.
The Fair and Immediate Release of Generic Drugs Act, or “FAIR Generics Act,” H.R. 1506, and
its Senate counterpart, the Expanding Access to Low-Cost Generic Drugs Act, S. 2476, are the
latest efforts in this direction. These bills are quite similar to bills that were introduced in 2009
as the Drug Price Competition Act of 2009 (S.1315) and in 2011 and 2015 as the Fair And
Immediate Release of Generic Drugs Act, or the “FAIR GENERxICS Act” (S. 1882 and S. 131,
respectively). The language of the amendments created by these bills is very complex and
difficult to parse, a natural consequence of how difficult it is to define the requirements for 180day exclusivity in a manner that precludes gaming but retains the intended incentive for generic
companies to challenge Orange Book listed patents.
H.R. 1506 would substantially change the definition of a “first applicant” under 21 U.S.C
355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II). Under Hatch-Waxman, 180-day exclusivity goes to “first applicants.” The
20

Id.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).
22
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate The Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489 (2007).
21
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Act currently defines a “first applicant” as any applicant that, “on the first day on which a
substantially complete application containing a [Paragraph IV certification] is submitted for
approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that contains and lawfully
maintains a [Paragraph IV certification] for the drug.” Under this definition, there can be more
than one first applicant if more than one generic company files a “substantially complete”
application containing a Paragraph IV certification on the same day and “lawfully maintains”
that certification. As discussed above, the MMA introduced a number of “forfeiture events” that
will result in a first applicant forfeiting the 180-day exclusivity period. 23
H.R. 1506 would expand the definition of “first applicant” to include a new category of first
applicants, i.e., there would be two categories of “first applicants.”. The first category,
designated “(v)(I) applicants,” would retain the identical definition that currently applies to first
applicants. In other words, a generic filer that meets the current requirements to qualify as a first
applicant would qualify under the proposed amendment as a “(v)(I) applicant.” But H.R. 1506
would create a second category of “(v)(II) applicants,” and here is where things get complicated.
To my mind there is some ambiguity in the language of the bill defining the requirements for
(v)(II) applicants, so I will discuss two possible interpretations of the language. First, here is the
language I considered to be ambiguous verbatim:
The applicant described in clause (v)(II) submitted and lawfully maintains
a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) or a statement
described in paragraph (2)(A)(viii) for each unexpired patent for which a
first applicant described in clause (v)(I) had submitted a certification
described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) on the first day on which a
substantially complete application containing such a certification was
submitted. 24
The ambiguity I see is the meaning of the last part of the definition, italicized above. I think the
most plausible interpretation would be that the phrase “on the first day on which a substantially
complete application containing such a certification was submitted” refers to a “first applicant
described in clause (v)(I) had submitted a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV).”
If that is the case, the language is entirely redundant, because by definition a (v)(I) applicant has
submitted a Paragraph IV certification “on the first day on which a substantially complete
application containing such a certification was submitted.” But assuming this is the correct
interpretation, the bill creates a new category of (v)(II) applicants that can qualify for first
applicant status by submitting and lawfully maintaining a Paragraph IV certification or a
Paragraph viii certification at any point in time, i.e., a (v)(II) applicant could qualify for first
applicant status without filing a substantially complete application containing a Paragraph IV
certification on the first day on which such application was filed.

23
24

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(vi)(I) as amended under H.R. 1506 (emphasis added).
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The other interpretation I can see as plausible, would be to interpret the phrase “on the first day
on which a substantially complete application containing such a certification was submitted” as
referring to the (v)(II) applicant. Under this interpretation, the bill would expand the definition
of first applicant by allowing a party to qualify merely by submitting and lawfully maintaining a
Paragraph IV certification, even if that certification is not part of the submission of a
“substantially complete application.” It would also expand the definition to encompass a generic
company that files a Paragraph VIII carve-out certification 25 rather than a Paragraph VI
certification. But the certification would have to be filed “on the first day on which a
substantially complete application containing such a certification was submitted.”
The first interpretation appears to be closer to the expressed intent of the bill’s sponsor, which is
to “allow[] a third competing product to enter the market.” 26 Along similar lines, a press release
by Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr., Chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, states
that H.R. 1506 would “allow[] any generic filer who wins a patent challenge in court or is not
sued for patent infringement by the brand company to share in the 180-day exclusivity period of
a first applicant.” 27
H.R. 1506 would impose additional requirements on (v)(II) applicants that would not be
applicable to (v)(I) applicants. In particular, with regard to each unexpired patent for which the
(v)(II) applicant has submitted a Paragraph IV certification, either: (1) no action for patent
infringement was brought within the 45-day period provided under the Hatch-Waxman Act; (2)
or if an action was brought within that time period, the action was withdrawn or dismissed by a
court without a decision that the patent was invalid and infringed; or (3) if an action was brought
and not dismissed or withdrawn, the applicant has obtained a court decision that the patent is
invalid or not infringed. Furthermore, if a (v)(I) applicant has begun commercial marketing of
the generic drug, the (v)(II) applicant may not begin commercial marketing of the drug until 30
days after a (v)(I) applicant began marketing the drug.
H.R. 1506 would also create a variety of escalating consequences for an ANDA applicant that
enters into an agreement with the holder of the application for the listed drug (or an owner of a
patent as to which any applicant submitted a certification qualifying such applicant for the 180day exclusivity period) whereby that applicant agrees either (1) not to seek an approval of its
application that is made effective on the earliest possible date, or (2) not to begin the commercial

25

The Paragraph VIII carve-out certification is based on 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), which provides that “An
abbreviated application for a new drug shall contain[,] if with respect to the listed drug referred to in clause (i)
information was filed under subsection (b) or (c) for a method of use patent which does not claim a use for which
the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection, a statement that the method of use patent does not claim
such a use.”
26
Press Release, Rep. Barragán Introduces Legislation to Lower Prescription Drug Prices (March 19, 2019),
available at https://barragan.house.gov/rep-barragan-introduces-legislation-to-lower-prescription-drug-prices/ (last
visited May 11, 2019).
27
Press Release, Pallone Unveils Policy Solutions to Lower Prescription Drug Prices, available at
https://pallone.house.gov/media/press-releases/pallone-unveils-policy-solutions-lower-prescription-drug-prices (last
visited May 11, 2019).
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marketing of its drug on the earliest possible date after its application is approved. In particular,
the bill creates a FDA notification requirement, pursuant to which an ANDA holder is required
to submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services the text of any such agreement to defer
approval or commercial marketing, or, if such an agreement has not been reduced to text, a
written detailed description of such agreement that is sufficient to disclose all the terms and
conditions of the agreement. The ANDA holder is also required to submit the text (or written
detailed description) of any other agreements that are contingent upon, provide a contingent
condition for, or are otherwise related to an agreement to defer approval or commercial
marketing. The bill specifies that any information or documentary materials submitted may not
be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding,
or if disclosure is required by Congress.
H.R. 1506 would also limit the ability of ANDA applicants to enter into agreements containing
an acceleration feature. In particular, if an agreement to defer approval or commercial
marketing, as defined above, includes more than one possible date when an ANDA applicant
may seek approval of its application or begin commercial marketing the drug, then the bill
specifies that the applicant may only seek approval of its application or begin commercial
marketing of its drug on the date that is the earlier of (1) the latest date set forth in the agreement
on which that applicant can receive an approval or begin commercial marketing, without regard
to any other provision of such agreement pursuant to which the commercial marketing could
begin on an earlier date; or (2) 180 days after another first applicant begins commercial
marketing of such drug. This provision is presumably intended to discourage ANDA applicants
from entering into agreements with acceleration clauses that allow for an earlier date of market
entry in the event another company brings a generic drug to market. These acceleration clauses
are seen by some as anticompetitive, since they create a situation in which other generic
companies might be dissuaded from entering the market by the fact that one or more other
generic companies have entered into an agreement that allows that company to immediately
enter the market to compete with the first generic market entrant.
H.R. 1506 also defines a category of “disqualifying agreement” that will result in forfeiture of
first applicant status (and hence forfeiture of 180-day GE) by any ANDA applicant that enters
into such an agreement. A “disqualifying agreement” is defined as an agreement between an
ANDA applicant and the holder of the application for the listed drug (or an owner of one or more
of the patent as to which any applicant submitted a certification qualifying such applicant for the
180-day exclusivity period) whereby that applicant agrees, directly or indirectly, not to seek an
approval of its application or not to begin the commercial marketing of its drug until the date that
is after the expiration of the 180-day exclusivity period awarded to another applicant with
respect to the drug.
H.R. 1506 would also amend the Patent Act such that the holder of an Orange Book listed patent
would only be allowed to enforce its patent under the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act
pertaining to ANDA and 505(b)(2) filings; the patent holder would be precluded from seeking
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any remedy under the general infringement provisions of the Patent Act. In particular, the bill
would amend 35 U.S.C. 271(e) by adding at the end of the following:
The exclusive remedy under this section for infringement of a patent for
which the Secretary of Health and Human Services has published
information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) or (c)(2) of section 505 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be an action brought under this
subsection within the 45-day period described in subsection (j)(5)(B)(iii) or
(c)(3)(C) of section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
This provision would seem to severely penalize the holders of Orange Book listed patents. Not
only would the patent owner forfeit the ability to enforce its patent against a generic competitor
after the expiration of the 45-day window for filing a Hatch-Waxman lawsuit, it would be unable
to enforce its listed patents at all against an infringer that has not filed for approval of its drug
under an ANDA or 505(b)(2) abbreviated approval pathway.
To summarize, H.R. 1506 would significantly complicate and increase the ambiguity of the
Hatch-Waxman, which is already notorious for its complexity and ambiguity. The bill appears to
simultaneously devalue both Orange Book listed patents and 180-day exclusivity.

Conclusion
Trying to keep track of all the legislative activity centered on drug pricing and generic
competition is a fast-moving target, but it appears likely that some aspects of the proposed
legislation will be enacted. The likely result will be an even more complicated statutory
framework regulating brand-generic disputes. Whether this will translate into lower drug prices
without a reduction in the incentive for innovation remains an open question.
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